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GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE—
LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER’S  
SAVING GRACE 
DANIEL M. VITAGLIANO† 
INTRODUCTION 
 Scholars and law students alike have described the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “confused,”1  
a “mess,”2 and “chaos.”3  Supreme Court justices have also 
expressed disapproval and frustration.4  Legislative prayer, the 
custom of beginning governmental sessions with prayer, is one 
particular facet of Establishment Clause jurisprudence that lacks 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, University of Rhode Island. I thank my 
Note advisor, Professor Mark L. Movsesian, for his invaluable insight and guidance. 
I also thank Professor Marc O. DeGirolami for thoughtful comments. It has been a 
privilege working under their tutelage as a student fellow for the St. John’s Center 
for Law and Religion. I will always be grateful for their mentorship. Finally, I thank 
the editors and members of the St. John’s Law Review for their hard work preparing 
my Note for publication. 
1 E.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment 
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006); Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment 
Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239,  
294 (2003). 
2 E.g., Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in 
Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 
315, 315 (2007); Gey, supra note 1, at 725. 
3 E.g., Lawrence J. Chanice, Comment, Sante Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe: Establishment Clause Chaos on the High School Gridiron, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 137, 137 (2001); John W. Huleatt, Comment, Accommodation or Endorsement? 
Stark v. Independent School District: Caught in the Tangle of Establishment Clause 
Chaos, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 657, 657 (1998). 
4 See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Assoc. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (mem.) (describing the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “in shambles”); Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 n.1 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our 
jurisprudential confusion [under the Establishment Clause] has led to results that 
can only be described as silly.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray . . . .”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence as “embarrassing”). 
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clarity.5  The Supreme Court has only ever decided two 
legislative prayer cases—Marsh v. Chambers6 in 1983 and Town 
of Greece v. Galloway7 in 2014—denying certiorari in seven other 
cases.8 
Legislative prayer doctrine is “sometimes described as 
‘carving out an exception’ to the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.”9  Unlike most other Establishment Clause 
claims, the Court has refrained from applying one of its 
pre-existing “tests”10—in particular, the Lemon test11—because 
 
5 See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment 
Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 222 
(2008) (noting the “fundamental[] flaw[s]” in the Court’s Establishment Clause 
framework and describing legislative prayer as an “unworkable situation”); 
Christopher C. Lund, Leaving Disestablishment to the Political Process, 10 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 53 (2014) (describing the constitutional standards of 
legislative prayer as “unclear”). 
6 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
7 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
8 See Bormuth v. Jackson County, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.); Rowan  
County v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (mem.); Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 571 U.S. 
944 (2013) (mem.); Forsyth County v. Joyner, 565 U.S. 1157 (2012) (mem.); Turner v. 
City Council of Fredericksburg, 555 U.S. 1099 (2009) (mem.); Simpson v. 
Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 546 U.S. 937 (2005) (mem.); Snyder v. Murray 
City Corp., 526 U.S. 1039 (1999) (mem.). 
9 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796, 813 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). The Court’s reasoning in its most recent Establishment 
Clause case, which involved the constitutionality of a large cross-shaped World War 
I memorial on public land, indicates that the general approach taken by the Court in 
its legislative prayer cases—that is, a history-and-tradition-based approach—is 
broader than some may have first thought. See generally Am. Legion v. Am. 
Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). For a broad survey of the Court’s use of 
tradition as a means of constitutional interpretation, see generally Marc O. 
DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (St. John’s Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 19-0019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3349187. 
10 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no 
pretense of subjecting Nebraska’s practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal 
‘tests’ that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establishment 
Clause.”). For an in-depth discussion of Establishment Clause standards and 
theories, see Gey, supra note 1, at 728–64. 
11 Under the Lemon test, courts must determine whether the challenged 
government action (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a “principal or primary 
effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) does “not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
603, 612–13 (1971) (first citing Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); then quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), Justice 
O’Connor proposed a refinement to Lemon’s effect prong: that governmental action 
“not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.” This standard was adopted by a majority of the Court in 
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“history support[s] the conclusion that legislative invocations are 
compatible with the Establishment Clause.”12  This is not to say 
legislative prayer is per se constitutional, because the Court has 
made clear it is not.  Only prayer practices that “fit[] within the 
tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures” 
accord with the Establishment Clause.13  While the Supreme 
Court strongly suggests that legislative prayer, as a general 
matter, is constitutional, there is tremendous confusion over how 
to adjudicate challenges to legislative prayer practices, especially 
prayer practices that differ factually from those upheld in Marsh 
and Town of Greece. 
Two recent circuit court decisions highlight this confusion.  
First, in Lund v. Rowan County, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, held that the Rowan County Board of Commissioners’ 
practice of beginning board meetings with a prayer composed and 
delivered by one of its members violated the Establishment 
Clause for the following four reasons: (1) the commissioners 
served as the sole prayer givers; (2) the prayers exclusively 
invoked, and sometimes advanced, Christianity; (3) the 
commissioners invited attendees to participate in the prayers; 
and (4) the local government setting increased the potential for 
coercion.14  Two months later, in Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 
the Sixth Circuit, also sitting en banc, upheld the Jackson  
 
 
 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69, 76 (1985), and has come to be known as the 
“endorsement test.” For further discussion of the endorsement test, see generally 
Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well: A Cause for Celebration and 
Sorrow, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1273 (2013). The Lemon test has been criticized by 
Supreme Court justices, lower court judges, and scholars for decades. See, e.g., Am. 
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081 nn.13–15 (2019) (collecting 
criticisms). And although five or more sitting justices have, on multiple occasions, 
rejected or expressed disapproval of the Lemon test in at least some contexts, see, 
e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 passim; McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), it is yet to be explicitly overruled by a 
majority of the Court, leaving scholars to speculate its fate, see, e.g., Marc O. 
DeGirolami, Cross Purposes, PUB. DISCOURSE (June 24, 2019), https://www.thepublic 
discourse.com/2019/06/53508/. 
12 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575. Kent Greenawalt writes that the Court 
dispensed with the Lemon test in the legislative prayer context because sometimes 
“accurate application of the test yields results that are mistaken under the 
constitutional provision.” KENT GREENAWALT, 2 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 50 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
13 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577. 
14 863 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (10-5 decision), cert denied,  
138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
812	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:809		
County Board of Commissioners’ commissioner-led invocation 
practice15—which was practically identical to Rowan County’s.  
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases.16 
Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of Rowan County’s 
petition for certiorari and authored an opinion joined by Justice 
Gorsuch.17  He began his dissent rather bluntly: “This Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”18  He then 
criticized the Fourth Circuit’s decision as “both unfaithful to  
[the Court’s] precedents and a historical [sic].”19  Lastly, he 
highlighted the Fourth Circuit’s failure to consider the country’s 
long history of legislator-led prayer and argued the Court should 
have taken the case to resolve the circuit split.20 
One reason for the conflict between the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits’ rulings, as well as the general confusion over legislative 
prayer—in Lund and Bormuth, legislator-led prayer—is the 
Supreme Court’s failure to confront a doctrinal dichotomy: 
whether legislative prayer constitutes government or private 
speech and how classifying legislative prayer as one or the other 
affects the Establishment Clause analysis. 
This Note argues that Lund was decided incorrectly in part 
because the Fourth Circuit failed to analyze the type of speech at 
issue before assessing the constitutionality of the prayer practice.  
This Note is composed of four parts.  Part I surveys the Supreme 
Court’s legislative prayer jurisprudence—Marsh and Town of 
Greece.  Part II outlines Lund and Bormuth, and the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits’ dissimilar applications of the Supreme Court’s 
precedent.  Part III argues that courts must first classify 
legislative prayers as either government or private speech before 
assessing whether a prayer practice violates the Establishment 
Clause.  It further argues that legislator-led prayer is a form of 
government speech.  Lastly, Part IV, the most extensive of this 
Note, argues that because legislator-led prayer is government 
speech, courts must focus on the intent underlying legislator-led 
prayer practices, and only practices motivated by impermissible 
purposes should be deemed unconstitutional.  It then proposes a 
 
15 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (9-6 decision), cert denied,  
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). 
16 Bormuth v. Jackson County, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.); Rowan  
County v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (mem.). 
17 Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 2566. 
20 Id. at 2566–67. 
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framework to determine whether a legislative prayer practice 
classified as government speech is motivated by impermissible 
intent and analyzes under this framework the legislator-led 
prayer practices in Lund and Bormuth. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Marsh v. Chambers 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of 
legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.21  In 1980, Nebraska 
State Senator Earnest Chambers brought an action challenging 
the legislature’s custom of beginning each session with a prayer 
delivered by a paid chaplain.22  The chaplain was a Presbyterian 
minister who had served in that post since 1965.23  Both the 
District Court of Nebraska and the Eighth Circuit found that the 
practice violated the Establishment Clause.24  The Supreme 
Court disagreed. 
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, 
found that legislative prayer is “deeply embedded in the history 
and tradition of this country” and has always coexisted with the 
Establishment Clause.25  The Court highlighted that one of the 
First Congress’s actions was to adopt a policy to appoint a paid 
chaplain to deliver invocations at each congressional session, 
with most states, including Nebraska, following its lead.26  
Because the language of the Bill of Rights was agreed upon three 
days after this policy was enacted, the Court concluded that the 
Framers did not understand the Establishment Clause to 
prohibit legislative prayer.27 
 
 
21 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
22 Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585, 586 (D. Neb. 1980). 
23 Id. 
24 The district court found that although the prayers themselves did not violate 
the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test, the use of public funds to finance a 
chaplain “of one faith, of one denomination, of one set of religious beliefs, embodied 
in one person” was impermissible. Id. at 588–89, 592. The Eighth Circuit affirmed 
the judgment but held that the practice taken as a whole violated all three prongs of 
Lemon. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234–35 (8th Cir. 1982). 
25 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
26 Id. at 787–89. 
27 Id. at 788, 791. 
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The Court went on to dismiss arguments contesting three 
specific features of the Nebraska Legislature’s prayer practice.  
First, the Court held that “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s 
reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, . . . his 
long tenure does not in itself conflict with the Establishment 
Clause.”28  Second, the Court took no issue with the chaplain’s 
remuneration because the Continental Congress and some of the 
early states compensated their chaplains.29  Finally, the Court 
held that the Judeo-Christian nature of the prayers was 
acceptable because “there [wa]s no indication that the prayer 
opportunity ha[d] been exploited to proselytize or advance any 
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”30  Accordingly, the 
Court held that Nebraska’s prayer practice did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the prayer practice 
would fail any of the Court’s Establishment Clause tests.31  He 
also expressed concerns that legislative prayer would spark 
political controversies along religious lines and ultimately 
alienate religious minorities.32  Justice Stevens, also in dissent, 
argued that the chaplain’s sixteen-year tenure reflected an 
unconstitutional preference for Presbyterianism.33 
B. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter 
Nine years later, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, a case involving the constitutionality of a 
crèche displayed in a courthouse, the Court discussed its holding 
in Marsh and indicated that legislative prayers must be 
nonsectarian, to avoid unconstitutional endorsement of  
a particular creed or sect.34  This generated tremendous 
confusion among lower courts35 and spurred rigorous debate 
among scholars.36 
 
28 Id. at 793–94 (explaining that the chaplain “was reappointed because his 
performance and personal qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him”). 
29 Id. at 794. 
30 Id. at 794–95 (“That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive 
evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.”). 
31 Id. at 800–01, 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 808. 
33 Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
34 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (explaining that the prayers at issue in Marsh were 
constitutional because “the particular chaplain had ‘removed all references to 
Christ’ ” (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14)). 
35 Compare Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298–99 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(holding unconstitutional a town council’s prayer practice because the prayers 
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C. Town of Greece v. Galloway 
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided its second legislative 
prayer case: Town of Greece v. Galloway.37  In 1999, Greece, New 
York, began opening its town board meetings with invocations 
delivered by local volunteer ministers.38  Greece selected these 
ministers through an informal process of calling congregations 
listed in the town directory.39  The town welcomed invocations 
from clergymen or laypeople of any faith—or no faith—and never 
denied a would-be prayer-giver’s request.40  However, almost all 
of the congregations in Greece were Christian; and until 2007, all 
of the prayer-givers were too.41  Susan Galloway and Linda 
Stephens sued, claiming the town was sponsoring sectarian 
prayers and expressing a preference for Christian prayer-givers, 
in violation of the Establishment Clause.42 
The Supreme Court ruled in the town’s favor.  The Court, in 
an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, began by noting that 
the Establishment Clause—legislative prayer practices in 
particular—“must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical 
practices and understandings.’ ”43  The Court framed the issue as 
 
“ ‘frequently’ contained references to ‘Jesus Christ,’ and thus promoted one religion 
over all others” (footnote omitted)), with Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 
1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[T]he context of the decision in 
Marsh . . . underscores the conclusion that the mere fact a prayer evokes a 
particular concept of God is not enough to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”). 
36 Compare Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of 
Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 995–96 (2010) (arguing that County 
of Allegheny created a “nonsectarian standard” for legislative prayer), with Robert 
Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the “Prayer Police”: Why the 
First Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands a “Practice 
Focused” Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 571 (2008) (“Marsh permits the use 
of sectarian references despite the confusion within lower federal courts generated 
by reliance on dicta contained in County of Allegheny . . . .”). 
37 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
38 Id. at 570. 
39 Id. at 571. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. Once litigation commenced, however, Greece invited a Jewish layman and 
the chairman of a Baha’i temple to deliver invocations and granted a Wiccan 
priestess’s request to do so. Id. at 572. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 576–77 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)) (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the precise 
boundaries of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific 
practice is permitted.”). 
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“whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the 
tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”44 
The Court held that Greece’s sectarian invocations were well 
within the scope of traditional legislative prayer, dismissing 
County of Allegheny’s discussion of Marsh as sheer dictum.45  The 
Court found that requiring legislative prayer to be nonsectarian 
would force legislatures and judges to monitor and censor 
religious speech, impermissibly entangling government in 
religious affairs.46  It further explained that once prayer is 
invited into the public domain, the government cannot restrict 
speakers from praising their deity as conscience dictates.47  The 
Court made clear, however, that the content of legislative prayers 
is not unrestrained: the prayers must serve a legitimate 
purpose—for example, “to unite lawmakers in their common 
effort” or “to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values long 
part of the Nation’s heritage.”48  Prayer practices that over time 
reflect a “pattern” of denigration or proselytization will 
necessarily fall short of these permissible purposes and trigger 
constitutional limits.49  Lastly, the Court held that the eight-year 
span of solely Christian ministers was constitutionally 
insignificant because Greece never discriminated against 
non-Christian prayer-givers.50  Accordingly, the Court upheld 
Greece’s prayer practice.51 
 
44 Id. at 577. 
45 Id. at 579–80. 
46 Id. at 581 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 187–89 (2012)). 
47 Id. at 582. 
48 Id. at 582–83. 
49 Id. at 583, 585. Two remarks explicitly denigrated nonbelievers and religious 
minorities, but the Court found that these two instances “d[id] not despoil a practice 
that on the whole reflect[ed] and embrace[d] our tradition.” Id. at 585. 
50 Id. at 585–86 (cautioning against affirmative steps to “promote ‘a “diversity” 
of religious views’ ” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring))). 
51 The Court also dismissed arguments that the prayers were unduly coercive. A 
plurality of the Court found that a reasonable observer would likely be familiar with 
the tradition of legislative prayer and understand that the practice is not meant to 
proselytize. Id. at 587 (plurality opinion) (citing Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 
720–21 (2010) (plurality opinion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 
308 (2000)). The plurality also acknowledged alternatives for attendees who disagree 
with the prayers: exit the room, arrive after the invocation, or voice a later protest. 
Id. at 590. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, 
arguing that only “actual legal coercion” by “force of law and threat of penalty” is 
relevant to the Establishment Clause, not psychological coercion as alleged by the 
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The case drew several other opinions.  Justice Alito, in 
concurrence, stressed that the predominance of Christian 
ministers resulted from carelessness, not discriminatory intent.52  
He also discussed how the delegates to the First Continental 
Congress, despite being divided in religious sentiments, approved 
of emphatically Christian prayer as a means to unite, not 
divide.53  Justice Kagan, in dissent, conceded that Marsh was 
correctly decided, but she distinguished Greece’s practice in that 
the prayers offered “were predominantly sectarian.”54  She also 
argued that Greece’s failure to recognize and accommodate 
pluralism violated the constitutional command of religious 
neutrality.55 
II. ENTER LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
Town of Greece was harshly criticized by scholars for its 
inconsistent and contradictory language and for its failure to 
dictate a definitive test.56  Even after Town of Greece, tremendous 
uncertainty and confusion remains regarding the proper 
standard to adjudicate challenges to legislative prayer practices; 
hence, the conflicting outcomes in Lund and Bormuth. 
A. Lund v. Rowan County 
In March 2013, Nancy Lund, Liesa Montag-Siegal, and 
Robert Voelker sued Rowan County, North Carolina, over its 
commissioner-led prayer practice.57  The county board would 
begin each bimonthly meeting with an invocation delivered by 
 
plaintiffs. Id. at 608–10 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
52 Id. at 593–94 (Alito, J., concurring). 
53 Id. at 600–01. 
54 Id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 257 n.93 (2014) (stating that a “flat contradiction” 
concerning coercion “reflects poorly on the coherence of the opinion”); Lund, supra 
note 5, at 52–53 (“While the Court is clear about its desire to raise the bar, it is 
profoundly unclear on where exactly it means to set it. The Court offers a multitude 
of vague and slightly inconsistent phrases. . . . The predictable result is that no one 
has any idea where the line is.”); Krista M. Pikus, Hopeful Clarity of Hopeless 
Disarray?: An Examination of Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment 
Clause, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 387, 408 (2015) (opining that the Court “was unwilling 
or unable to” clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 103, 228–230. 
57 Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
818	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:809		
one of its five elected commissioners.58  Only commissioners were 
permitted to deliver the invocation, doing so on a rotating basis 
as an incident of time-honored custom.59  All in attendance would 
be asked to rise and join in the prayer.60  Over a 
five-and-a-half-year period, “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Savior” were 
referenced in ninety-seven percent of the board’s prayers.61 
In July 2017, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that 
the Rowan County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice 
violated the Establishment Clause.62  In an opinion authored by 
Judge Wilkinson, the majority emphasized two conceptual 
differences in Rowan County’s practice from those upheld by the 
Supreme Court: (1) legislators themselves, not outside ministers, 
led the prayers; and (2) the prayer opportunity was restricted to 
legislators.63  Thus, the court found that Rowan County’s prayer 
practice created a higher risk of religious endorsement and 
coercion than the prayer practices upheld in Marsh and Town of 
Greece.64 
Judge Wilkinson acknowledged the history and tradition of 
lawmaker-led prayer in federal, state, and local governments but 
found that while such prayer “is not inherently unconstitutional,” 
“the identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the constitutional 
inquiry.”65  He stressed the distinction between extending, as 
opposed to restricting, the prayer opportunity to legislators.66  By 
limiting the prayer opportunity to commissioners—all of whom 
were Protestant Christian—the board restricted what faiths 
could be referenced, “creat[ing] a ‘closed universe’ of 
prayer-givers dependent solely on election outcomes.”67  Judge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Id. at 272. 
59 Id. at 272–73. 
60 Id. at 272. 
61 Id. at 273 (citing Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 714  
(M.D.N.C. 2015)). 
62 Id. at 272. 
63 Id. at 277. 
64 Id. at 278–79. 
65 Id. at 280. 
66 Id. at 279. 
67 Id. at 281–82 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723 
(M.D.N.C. 2015)). 
2019]	 GOVERNMENT	SPEECH	DOCTRINE	 819	
Wilkinson expressed concerns over the potential for “political 
division along religious lines” should prayer-giver selection be 
left to the political process.68 
Judge Wilkinson then analyzed three additional aspects of 
the board’s prayer practice.  First, he reviewed the content of the 
prayers.69  He found that the board unconstitutionally advanced 
Christianity “[b]y proclaiming the spiritual and moral supremacy 
of Christianity, characterizing the political community as a 
Christian one, and urging adherents of other religions to embrace 
Christianity.”70  Second, Judge Wilkinson assessed the 
commissioners’ requests for attendees to stand and join in the 
prayers.  These requests, he determined, were indicative of “an 
effort ‘to promote religious observance among the public.’ ”71  He 
also emphasized the proselytizing effect of such invitations 
coming from town leaders, which Town of Greece explicitly 
cautioned against.72  Finally, the local intimate setting was 
deemed unduly coercive because the attendees’ alternatives—
arrive late, leave the room, or remain seated—“served only to 
marginalize.”73  Accordingly, given “the totality of the 
circumstances,” the Fourth Circuit held that the Rowan County 
Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice violated the 
Establishment Clause.74 
B. Bormuth v. County of Jackson 
In August 2013, Peter Bormuth brought an action 
challenging the constitutionality of the Jackson County, 
Michigan, Board of Commissioners’ commissioner-led prayer 
practice.75  At the start of each board meeting, the chairman of 
the board would request all present to stand and bow their 
heads.76  On a rotating basis, one of the board’s nine elected 
 
68 Id. at 282 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)). The prayer 
practice did in fact create a contentious campaign issue in the 2016 board elections, 
with two incumbents who favored the practice prevailing over two challengers. Id. 
69 The court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s warning to not supervise and 
censor religious speech but explained that an inquiry into the “entire record” was 
necessary. Id. at 283. 
70 Id. at 286. 
71 Id. at 287 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 588 (2014) 
(plurality opinion)). 
72 Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion)). 
73 Id. at 288. 
74 Id. at 289. 
75 Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
76 Id. 
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commissioners would then deliver a solemn, often Christian, 
invocation.77  Other commissioners would not review the content 
of prayers individually or as a board.78  Bormuth, a self-professed 
Pagan and Animist, found the prayers “severely offensive” and 
raised his concerns to the board during the public comment 
segment of a meeting.79  Bormuth claimed that when he did so, a 
commissioner “swiveled his chair and turned his back to [him].”80  
He alleged further that after he commenced this lawsuit, the 
board declined to appoint him to a planning committee, selecting 
two less-qualified candidates instead.81 
In September 2017, an en banc court of the Sixth Circuit 
upheld the Jackson County Board of Commissioners’ prayer 
practice.82  In an opinion authored by Judge Griffin, the majority 
emphasized Town of Greece’s instruction “to focus upon ‘the 
prayer opportunity as a whole’ in light of ‘historical practices and 
understandings.’ ”83  Judge Griffin found that legislator-led 
prayer was amply supported by history and tradition.84  In 
addition, he noted the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
legislator-led prayer.  He pointed to the Marsh Court citing an 
amicus brief describing how numerous legislatures permit 
member-led invocations and how in Town of Greece a councilman 
had delivered an invocation and others had offered silent 
prayers.85  Accordingly, the court found no constitutionally 
significant distinction between lawmaker-led and 
lawmaker-approved prayer.86 
Next, Judge Griffin considered the content of the prayers.  
The predominantly Christian prayers were consistent with those 
accepted by the Framers and in compliance with the content 
restrictions dictated in Town of Greece.87  Further, the individual 
 
77 Id. at 497–98. 
78 Id. at 498. 
79 Id. at 498–99. 
80 Id. at 499. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 498. The court acknowledged at the outset that its decision conflicts 
with the Fourth Circuit’s Lund decision, but it found the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning 
“unpersuasive.” Id. at 509 n.5. 
83 Id. at 509 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576,  
585 (2014)). 
84 Id. at 509–10. 
85 Id. at 510–11. 
86 Id. at 512. 
87 Id. Bormuth cited part of a prayer that he claimed denigrated minority faiths: 
“Bless the Christians worldwide who seem to be targets of killers and extremists.” 
Id. However, the court found that even assuming this language signaled disfavor 
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faiths of the commissioners—all nine of whom were Christian—
were deemed insignificant given the diversity of faiths—that is, 
the many different denominations—within Christianity and the 
“dynamic, not static,” composition of the board, which is subject 
to change with each election.88  Judge Griffin emphasized that 
the policy was facially neutral and nondiscriminatory; and given 
Marsh’s rejection of the Lemon test, the court dismissed claims of 
religious endorsement.89 
Lastly, the court dismissed Bormuth’s arguments regarding 
coercion.  First, Judge Griffin found that the commissioners’ 
“commonplace,” “reflexive” requests for attendees to rise and 
remain silent in no way mandated participation.90  Further, 
leaving the room, arriving late, or protesting after the prayer 
were deemed sufficient alternatives to protect against perceived 
pressure to participate.91  Second, while the commissioners “did 
react poorly to Bormuth’s actions,” context showed that “they 
reacted not to his beliefs but to the litigious way he chose to 
express them”—that is, filing another lawsuit.92  Third, there was 
no support in the record for Bormuth’s assertion that he did not 
receive his desired appointment because he objected to the prayer 
practice.93  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld Jackson 
County’s prayer practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
toward dissenters, this sole remark did not despoil the board’s prayer practice. Id. 
(quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585). 
88 Id. at 513. 
89 Id. at 513–15. 
90 Id. at 517 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 599 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
91 Id. at 516 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590 (plurality opinion)). The 
court reasoned that despite the Fourth Circuit finding that these options only 
marginalized the attendees, “they [were] options Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion 
expressly approved.” Id. at 516 n.11 (citing Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 
320 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Agee, J., dissenting)). 
92 Id. at 518 & n.12 (citing five additional cases where Bormuth sued 
government officials). 
93 Id. at 519. 
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III. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
Much has since been written about legislator-led prayer.94  
Amid this growing body of scholarship, there is no consensus on 
how courts should assess the constitutionality of legislator-led 
prayer practices.  Many authors criticize the Supreme Court for 
failing to sufficiently clarify a standard for legislative prayer that 
can apply broadly to the many unique prayer practices legislative 
bodies engage in.95  Some authors have even advanced new 
standards or tests for legislator-led prayer.96 
This Note argues that the general confusion over legislative 
prayer is due in part to courts’ failure to first classify the prayers 
as either government or private speech.  This speech inquiry is 
imperative because “different Establishment Clause rules apply 
to different types of speakers.”97  Considering First Amendment 
 
94 See generally, e.g., James A. Hill, Thou Shalt Not Speak: Why the 
Establishment Clause Should Be Concerned with Legislative Prayer in Bormuth v. 
County of Jackson, 23 TRINITY L. REV. 1 (2018); Nicholas J. Hunt, Let Us Pray: The 
Case for Legislator-Led Prayer, 54 TULSA L. REV. 49 (2018); John Gavin, Comment, 
Praying for Clarity: Lund, Bormuth, and the Split over Legislator-Led Prayer, 59 
B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 104 (2018); Mary Nobles Hancock, Note, God Save the 
United States and This Honorable County Board of Commissioners: Lund, Bormuth, 
and the Fight over Legislative Prayer, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2019); Joe H. 
Nguyen, Note, The Establishment Clause: The Lemon and Marsh Conflict, Where 
Lund and Bormuth Leave Us, and the Constitutionality of Exclusive, Legislator-Led 
Prayer, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135 (2019); Samuel Taxy, Comment, Pressure to 
Pray? Thinking Beyond the Coercion Test for Legislator-Led Prayer, 86 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 143 (2019); Robert W. T. Tucci, Comment, A Moral Minefield: Resolving the 
Dispute over Legislator-Led Invocations, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 601 (2018). 
95 See, e.g., Gavin, supra note 94, at 111 (noting that Town of Greece left an 
“unclear standard”); Nguyen, supra note 94, at 155 (“[T]he area of legislative prayer 
requires further clarification by the Supreme Court.”); Recent Cases, Lund v. Rowan 
County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 131 HARV. L. REV. 626, 630 (2017) 
(claiming the Fourth Circuit was “without a framework” and “left with little 
guidance” due to the factual distinctions between legislator-led prayer and the 
prayer practices in Marsh and Town of Greece); Taxy, supra note 94, at 184 (“Due to 
the lack of clarity in Town of Greece, many questions pending its resolution went 
unanswered, particularly how courts should analyze prayer given at  
local government meetings by councilmembers themselves.”); see also sources cited 
supra note 56. 
96 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 94, at 69 (proposing a “hybrid assessment” 
consisting of “a historical inquiry” and “an ‘actual legal coercion’ test”); Taxy, supra 
note 94, at 143 (arguing the practice “should be per se forbidden”); Tucci, supra note 
94, at 619 (proposing a “strict scrutiny standard”). 
97 Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian 
Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1061 (2011) [hereinafter 
Gaylord, When the Exception]; see also Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially 
Religious Government Speech: Summum’s Impact on the Free Speech and 
Establishment Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315, 391 (2010) [hereinafter 
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speech principles when assessing the constitutionality of 
legislative prayer practices would clarify how courts should apply 
the limits on legislative prayer dictated in Marsh and Town of 
Greece.  Specifically, First Amendment speech principles bear on 
issues including the claims challengers may pursue,98 
prayer-giver selection,99 content-based restrictions or 
requirements imposed by the legislature,100 and the content of the 
prayers.101 
The Supreme Court sidestepped the speech issue entirely in 
Town of Greece.102  Some parts of Town of Greece lend credence to 
a finding that the prayers were government speech, while other 
parts suggest private speech.103  Thus, this doctrinal dichotomy—
whether legislative prayer is government or private speech and 
how classifying legislative prayer as one or the other affects the 
Establishment Clause analysis—remains unanswered by the 
Court.104 
A. Legislative Prayer as Government Speech 
Classifying legislative prayer as government speech is a 
fairly well-explored proposition.  Professor Gaylord writes that 
legislative prayer is “a specific form of facially religious 
government speech” because the government controls the speech 
and conveys its own message.105  He writes further that where a 
third party—for example, a guest minister—offers the invocation, 
 
Gaylord, Facially Religious Government Speech] (“One must know whether the 
speech is government speech to know which Establishment Clause test to apply.”). 
98 See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra Section IV.C.2. 
100 See infra Section IV.C.3. 
101 See infra Section IV.C.4. 
102 Both parties and several amici raised arguments over whether the prayers 
were private or government speech. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Freedom 
from Religion Foundation in Support of Respondents at 27–31, Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5348583 (arguing that 
legislative prayer is government speech); Brief for Seven Prayer-Givers as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–9, Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696), 
2013 WL 4011047 (arguing that legislative prayer is private speech). 
103 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech, 6 CAL. L. 
REV. CIR. 37, 41–44 (2015). 
104 Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, recently cited 
Marsh as a case concerning “government-sponsored prayer” in which “the 
government itself is engaging in religious speech.” Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 910–11 (2019) (mem.) 
(Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). This suggests that these three 
justices would classify legislative prayer as government speech. 
105 Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1049–50. 
824	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:809		
the government essentially “adopt[s]” the speech as its own and 
conveys the speaker’s message.106  Professor Haupt asserts that 
Marsh was a case “decided on the merits as government 
speech.”107  But Haupt, unlike Gaylord, claims that assigning 
responsibility for speech is not as easy when a third party 
delivers the invocation.108 
Some, however, disagree that legislative prayer is 
government speech.  For example, Robert Luther III contends 
that legislative prayer cannot be government speech because 
“government cannot itself pray.”109  Professor Corbin argues that 
the prayers in Town of Greece were neither government nor 
private speech, but “mixed speech”—that is, speech that contains 
both governmental and private elements and “cannot be cleanly 
designated into one category or the other.”110  While there is a 
significant body of scholarship on mixed speech,111 including 
proposed standards for mixed speech cases,112 the Supreme Court 
has consistently classified expression as either exclusively 
governmental or exclusively private.113 
 
106 Id. at 1051. 
107 Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment 
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571, 617 (2011). 
108 Id. 
109 Robert Luther III, “Unity Through Division”: Religious Liberty and the Virtue 
of Pluralism in the Context of Legislative Prayer Controversies, 43 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2009). 
110 Corbin, supra note 103, at 38, 41 (“The message is the result of private and 
government control—the government created the prayer program and invited clergy 
to give prayers, while the clergy determined the content of the prayers.”). 
111 See generally, e.g., Corbin, supra note 103; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed 
Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 603 
(2008); Haupt, supra note 107. 
112 Professor Corbin argues mixed speech should be recognized as its own 
category and regulations should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Corbin, supra 
note 111, at 671–72, 675. For a critique of this argument, see Andy G. Olree, 
Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 408–10 (2009). Alternatively, 
Professor Haupt champions a continuum framework that assigns speech 
responsibility based on who maintains “effective control” over the message. Haupt, 
supra note 107, at 587–92. Further, she argues that where effective control is 
equally distributed between private and government actors, speech should be 
classified as “truly hybrid,” with “First Amendment policy interests support[ing]  
a finding of private speech despite considerable government involvement.” Id. at 
618–19, 628. 
113 Corbin, supra note 111, at 672; see, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 
(2017) (“Trademarks are private, not government, speech.”); Walker v. Tex. Div., 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“[S]pecialty license 
plates . . . convey government speech.”). 
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Lower courts tend to favor the government speech 
approach.114  Courts that have classified legislative prayer as 
government speech have held that this finding restricts the type 
of claims challengers may pursue, permitting only Establishment 
Clause claims and foreclosing claims under the Free Exercise, 
Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses.115  But courts have 
not considered government speech principles beyond this 
threshold matter.  Arguments to consider government speech 
principles were advanced in dissenting opinions in both Lund 
and Bormuth,116 but the majority opinions are devoid of any 
application of such principles.117 
B. Classifying Legislator-Led Prayer as Government Speech 
Legislator-led prayer should be classified as government 
speech.  When assigning responsibility for speech, courts must 
decide “whether a government entity is speaking on its own 
behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”118  The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that this is not always easy.119  
Notwithstanding, when legislators themselves offer prayers, 
 
114 See, e.g., Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 936 F.3d 142, 
158–59 (3d Cir. 2019) (classifying legislative prayer offered by a guest chaplain as 
government speech); Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354 
(4th Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation) (classifying 
legislator-led prayer as government speech); Simpson v. Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (classifying legislative prayer 
offered by a guest minister as government speech). 
115 See, e.g., Fields, 936 F.3d at 163 (rejecting claims under the Free Exercise, 
Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses); Turner, 534 F.3d at 356 (rejecting a 
claim under the Free Exercise Clause); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287–88 (rejecting 
claims under the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses). 
116 In Lund, Judge Agee argued that the majority erred in treating significant 
the prayer-givers’ identities. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 308 (4th Cir. 
2017) (en banc) (Agee, J., dissenting). More specifically, he argued that because 
legislative prayer is a form of government speech, the public would see no difference 
between paid chaplains, guest ministers, and the lawmakers who select them. Id. 
Conversely, in Bormuth, Judge Moore emphasized the prayer-givers’ identities, 
arguing that because the prayers are government speech, there is increased 
potential for endorsement of Christianity and coercion. Bormuth v. County of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 537 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
117 Judge Wilkinson seemingly recognized that legislator-led prayer is 
government speech, see Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (“[I]n Rowan County, the prayer-giver 
was the state itself.”); id. at 290 (“When one of Rowan County’s commissioners leads 
his constituents in prayer, he is not just another private citizen. He is a 
representative of the state, and he gives the invocation in his official capacity as a 
commissioner.”), but he failed to consider the effects of this in his analysis. 
118 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
119 Id. 
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determining who is speaking is rather straightforward.  
Legislator-led prayer is prayer by a legislator—“it is government 
speech by definition.”120  To be sure, a formal analysis is 
warranted. 
The Supreme Court considers three factors in determining 
whether speech is attributable to the government.  First, the 
Court looks to whether the mode of expression is “often closely 
identified in the public mind with the government.”121  Rather 
than speculate to the public’s perception, the Court analyzes 
whether the speech has a governmental purpose and is 
governmental in nature.122  For example, in Walker v. Texas 
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the Court found that 
members of the public perceive Texas specialty license plates as 
government messages because the designs are owned by the 
state, the plates serve to register and identify vehicles, and the 
top of each plate reads “TEXAS.”123  Legislator-led prayer 
similarly serves governmental purposes.  It “lend[s] gravity to 
the occasion,” “unite[s] lawmakers in their common effort,”124 and 
“eases the task of governing.”125  Furthermore, legislator-led 
prayer is governmental in nature.  The invocations are delivered 
by legislators at government meetings moments before 
policymaking126 or other governmental functions.127  And just as 
 
120 Lund, supra note 36, at 1017; cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 
(2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”). 
121 Summum, 555 U.S. at 472. 
122 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 
(2015). In Bormuth, Judge Sutton, in a rather perfunctory manner, stated that most 
people perceive legislative prayer as “a petition by the individual, not the State or 
City.” Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 523 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(Sutton, J., concurring). But this unsupported statement is nothing more than 
armchair speculation, which undermines Judge Sutton’s determination. See Daniel 
J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 
2017 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 36–37, 66 (2017) (arguing that judicial speculation with 
regard to public perception is “likely to be biased and inaccurate” and “colored by 
ideological motivation”). 
123 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
124 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 583, 587 (2014). 
125 Id. at 587 (plurality opinion). 
126 See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 290 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(“[T]he commissioner remains on the scene to participate in the Board’s 
decision-making.”); see also, e.g., Commissioner Meeting, ROWAN COUNTY  
(Feb. 18, 2013) (00:00–01:50), http://rowancountync.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php? 
view_id=2&clip_id=357 (approving the prior meeting’s minutes and moving to add a 
public hearing to the consent agenda directly after a legislator-led invocation). 
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license plates bear the state’s name or insignia, a town seal or 
flag is often displayed at public meetings.128 
Second, the Court considers whether the form of expression 
“long ha[s] communicated messages from the States.”129  In 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a Ten Commandments 
monument in a public park met this criterion because 
governments have historically used monuments “to convey some 
thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure.”130  
Legislator-led prayers also communicate state messages.  The 
prayers are delivered by lawmakers, and the custom, which has 
been practiced for centuries,131 conveys “a tolerable 
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this 
country”132 and “expresses a common aspiration to a just and 
peaceful society.”133  Moreover, legislators are the principal 
audience for the prayers.134  Just as government monuments 
instill some feeling in observers, legislator-led prayer 
“accommodate[s] the spiritual needs of lawmakers”135 and 
“invites [them] to reflect upon shared ideals and common 
ends.”136 
Lastly, the Court evaluates whether the government 
“maintains direct control over the messages conveyed.”137  For 
example, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, a 
government advertising campaign promoting beef consumption 
constituted government speech because the government 
“effectively controlled” the message and “exercise[d] final 
 
127 See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 591 (plurality opinion) (explaining that board 
members at this time may be swearing in new police officers or presenting residents 
with proclamations). 
128 See id. at 624 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing a prayer giver “step[ping] up 
to a lectern (emblazoned with the Town’s seal) at the front of the dais”);  
Rowan County NC (@rowancountync), TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:37 PM), 
https://twitter.com/rowancountync/status/932800218403352576 (featuring image of 
county seal on display). 
129  Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2248–49 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). 
130 555 U.S. at 470. 
131 See infra text accompanying note 154. 
132 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
133 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,  
693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
134 Id. at 587 (plurality opinion). 
135 Id. at 588. 
136 Id. at 583 (majority opinion). 
137 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,  
2249 (2015). 
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approval authority” over each advertisement.138  Similarly, the 
government controls the messages conveyed through 
legislator-led prayer.  If a policy contains content-based 
restrictions, or requires fellow legislators to pre-approve the 
content of each prayer, then the legislature “itself exercises 
substantial editorial control over the speech.”139  Even absent 
such a policy, government officials deliver the invocations while 
acting in their official capacities as legislators.140  Their status as 
legislators grants them the opportunity to deliver the 
invocation.141  Therefore, the government, through its legislators, 
“maintain[s] exclusive and complete control over the content of 
the prayers.”142  Accordingly, legislator-led prayer constitutes 
government speech.143 
Under the First Amendment, “the government may not 
regulate speech based on its substantive content” or “favor one 
speaker over another.”144  But when the government speaks, it is 
immune from the strictures of the Free Speech Clause.145  The 
government “ ‘is entitled to say what it wishes’ and to select the 
 
138 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005). 
139 Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354–55 (4th Cir. 
2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation); cf. Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“[M]unicipalities generally exercise editorial control over donated monuments 
through prior submission requirements, design input, requested modifications, 
written criteria, and legislative approvals of specific content proposals.”). 
140 Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 289–90 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
141 Id. at 290; see also Turner, 534 F.3d at 355 (“While Turner is the literal 
speaker, he is allowed to speak only by virtue of his role as a Council member.”); 
Lund, supra note 36, at 1017 (“When a city councilman or county commissioner has 
the chance to offer a prayer because of his governmental position, such a prayer is 
government speech.”). 
142 Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 
733 (M.D.N.C. 2014)). 
143 It does not necessarily follow that everything legislators say is government 
speech subject to the Establishment Clause. For example, legislators referencing 
their religious faiths during a floor debate would likely not trigger Establishment 
Clause scrutiny. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 523 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) 
(“In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be 
framed.”). And if such references were subject to Establishment Clause scrutiny, 
they would be analyzed under a different standard than legislative prayer, 
including, quite possibly, the Lemon test. See supra note 11. 
144 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) 
(first citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); then citing City 
Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). 
145 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009). 
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views that it wants to express.”146  Without this power, the 
government could not function because whenever the government 
acts, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and favors that 
viewpoint over those it rejects.147 
While acknowledging the necessity of the government speech 
doctrine, the Court recently cautioned against its expansion 
because of the potential for misuse—that is, the “government 
could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored 
viewpoints.”148  While this is true, the government’s ability to 
speak freely is not limitless: government speech is subject to the 
proscriptions of the Establishment Clause.149 
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE’S CONSTRAINTS ON 
LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
The Establishment Clause is the sole constitutional 
constraint on government speech.150  As Justice Souter noted in 
Summum, “The interaction between the ‘government speech 
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not, however, 
begun to be worked out.”151  While Marsh and Town of Greece 
prescribe several Establishment Clause principles that regulate 
legislative prayer, neither case considered First Amendment 
speech principles.  Before Town of Greece, several scholars 
theorized how government speech doctrine affects Establishment 
 
146 Id. at 467–68 (first quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; then citing Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); and then citing Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
147 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017). 
148 Id. at 1758. 
149 Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. Government speech is also constrained by the 
political process. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 
235 (2000) (“If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some 
different or contrary position.”). This Note does not explore the political implications 
of legislator-led prayer and whether, if at all, such implications should provide a 
basis to invalidate a prayer policy. Compare West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy [and] to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials . . . . [F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.”), with Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 890 (1990) (“Values that are protected against government interference through 
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political 
process.”). For an argument that the effects legislator-led prayer can have on the 
political process are grounds alone to forbid the practice, see Taxy, supra note 94, at 
177–83. 
150 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. 
151 Id. at 486 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Clause doctrine—legislative prayer in particular.152  This Note 
builds upon this pre-Town of Greece literature, proposing an 
analytical rubric for courts to use in determining whether 
legislative prayer classified as government speech violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
A. The Practice Must Be Rooted in History and Tradition 
The threshold inquiry for any legislative prayer case is 
whether the challenged practice “fits within the tradition long 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”153  Legislator-led 
prayer plainly does.  History reflects a tradition of legislator-led 
prayer dating back to before the Founding.  For example, in 1775, 
the South Carolina Provincial Congress appointed one of its 
members to offer prayers at the start of each session.154  
Moreover, in 1853, the Senate Judiciary Committee reconsidered 
the constitutionality of its chaplaincy program following calls for 
its abolition.155  It opted to retain the program, stating that the 
Founders “had no fear or jealousy of religion itself, nor did they 
wish to see us an irreligious people; they did not intend to 
prohibit a just expression of religious devotion by the legislators 
of the nation, even in their public character as legislators.”156  For 
well over a century, Congress has begun legislative sessions with 
member-led prayer.157  In addition, records of various state 
legislatures are replete with instances of lawmaker-led prayer.  
To name a few, the Illinois Senate has permitted legislator-led 
prayer since at least 1849;158 the Connecticut Senate since at 
least 1861;159 the Iowa Senate since at least 1862;160 the New 
 
152 See generally Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97; Gaylord, Facially 
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97; James H. Knippen II & Elizabeth M. 
Farmer, Does Prayer Before Public Bodies Violate the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment?, DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N BRIEF, Oct. 2011, at 28; Christopher 
C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46 (2009). 
153 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014). 
154 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 1112 (Peter Force ed., 1837). 
155 S. REP. NO. 32-376, at 1 (1853). 
156 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
157 E.g., 26 CONG. REC. 5878 (1894) (Rep. Everett); 27 CONG. REC. 1584 (1895) 
(Rep. Everett); 27 CONG. REC. 1629 (1895) (Rep. Everett); 23 CONG. REC. 5571 (1892) 
(Rep. McKinney). 
158 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS 51 (1849) (Sen. Richmond). 
159 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MAY SESSION, 
1861, at 231 (1861) (Rep. Denison); id. at 258 (Rep. Mitchell); id. at 406  
(Rep. Parmelee). 
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Hampshire House of Representatives since at least 1863;161 the 
Kansas Senate since at least 1867;162 the Alabama Senate since 
at least 1873;163 and the Michigan House of Representatives and 
Senate since at least 1879 and 1883, respectively.164  These 
examples sufficiently demonstrate a rich historical tradition of 
legislator-led prayer.165 
It must be acknowledged that the First Congress only 
engaged in chaplain-led prayer, not legislator-led prayer.166  But 
the Court’s reliance on one record of a single prayer offered at a 
Boston City Council meeting in 1910 to support a finding that 
local legislative bodies have historically engaged in legislative 
prayer167 precludes any basis to undermine the conclusion that, 
as a general matter, lawmaker-led prayer is a tradition long 
followed in Congress and state legislatures.168  The Court even 
recently reaffirmed its reasoning, explaining that although “the 
specific practice challenged in Town of Greece lacked the very 
direct connection, via the First Congress, to the thinking of those  
 
 
 
160 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE NINTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE 
OF IOWA 70 (1862) (Sen. Watson); id. at 503 (Sen. Teter). 
161 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF NEW 
HAMPSHIRE, JUNE SESSION, 1863, at 90 (1863) (Rep. Stewart); id. at 169, 293, 312 
(Rep. Lawrence); see also JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, JUNE SESSION, 1865, at 51 (1865) (Rep. Humphrey);  
id. at 58 (Rep. Cutting). 
162 SENATE JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
120 (1867) (Sen. Green); id. at 316 (President of the Senate). 
163 JOURNAL OF THE SESSION OF 1872–73 OF THE SENATE OF ALABAMA 561 
(1873) (Rep. Howell). 
164 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 
10 (1879) (Rep. Sharts); 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 228, 
303 (1883) (Rep. La Du); see also 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 12 (1887) (Sen. Westgate); 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN 94 (1897) (Sen. Campbell). 
165 The plaintiff in Bormuth argued that many historical examples involve 
prayers given by legislators who were also ministers. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 
870 F.3d 494, 510 n.7 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). As the Sixth Circuit recognized, this 
is of no constitutional significance because when the prayers were delivered, the 
legislators were not acting as ministers but in their official capacities as legislators. 
Id.; see also id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“And what of a legislator who is also a 
person of the cloth? Could John Danforth but not John McCain give an invocation? 
When a line offers no meaningful distinctions, it is a good time to ask whether the 
court should draw it.”). 
166 Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 294 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J., 
concurring). 
167 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014). 
168 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 510. 
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who were responsible for framing the First Amendment,” the 
practice nevertheless “fi[t] within the tradition long followed in 
Congress and the state legislatures.”169 
In addition to having deep historical roots, legislator-led 
prayer remains prevalent across all levels of government today.  
In Congress, members of both chambers lead opening prayers.170  
Furthermore, thirty-one state legislatures permit legislator-led 
prayer.171  Some states have enacted legislation or rules 
permitting the practice.172  In fact, the Rhode Island Legislature 
and Maryland’s House of Delegates only allow legislator-led 
invocations.173  Finally, countless local legislative bodies across 
the country open meetings with legislator-led prayer, many of 
which engage in exclusively legislator-led prayer.174  The robust, 
long-standing tradition of legislator-led prayer establishes that 
the custom is not per se unconstitutional. 
 
169 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2088–89 (2019) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577). 
170 See 161 CONG. REC. S3313 (daily ed. May 23, 2015) (Sen. Lankford);  
159 CONG. REC. S3915-01 (daily ed. June 4, 2013) (Sen. Cowan); 155 CONG. REC. 
S13401 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2009) (Sen. Barrasso); 119 CONG. REC. 17,441 (1973)  
(Rep. Hudnut III). 
171 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
5-151 to -152 tbl. 02-5.52 (2002). 
172 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-160(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 
No. 90) (authorizing local governments to adopt policies to permit lawmaker-led 
prayer); MICH. LEGISLATURE, MICHIGAN LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK & DIRECTORY: 
99TH LEGISLATURE 2017–2018, at 153 (2017) (“The Clerk shall arrange for a Member 
to offer an invocation . . . at the opening of each session of the House.”). 
173 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 171, at 5-152 tbl. 
02-5.52; Kate Havard, In Delegates They Trust: Md. House Members Lead Secular 
Prayer, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md- 
politics/in-delegates-they-trust-md-house-members-lead-secular-prayer/2013/03/09/ 
571fef8e-810a-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7c9b 
f1d695a1. 
174 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and Twenty-One Other 
States in Support of Jackson County and Affirmance at 10–12, Bormuth v. County of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No. 15-1896), 2017 WL 1710341 
(collecting data on counties in the Sixth Circuit that engage in lawmaker-led 
prayer); Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 12 Other States 
Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 12–19, 23–26, Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 
407 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1591), 2015 
WL 4692468 (collecting data on counties and cities in the Fourth Circuit that engage 
in lawmaker-led prayer). 
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B. Government Speech Doctrine Requires a Showing of 
Impermissible Intent for a Prayer Practice To Violate the 
Establishment Clause 
Marsh and Town of Greece prescribe several limits on 
legislative prayer generally.  First, the prayer opportunity must 
not be “exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief.”175  Second, prayer-giver 
selection must not “stem[] from an impermissible motive.”176  
Finally, the legislature must “maintain[] a policy of 
nondiscrimination” and not demonstrate “aversion or 
bias . . . against minority faiths.”177  All of these limits hinge on 
the legislature’s subjective intent.178 
Government speech doctrine demands that these limits be 
applied to require a manifestation of impermissible intent on 
behalf of the legislature for a prayer practice to run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.  First and foremost, a prayer practice 
must not be exploited.  As Professor Gaylord explains, “as a 
speaker, the government violates the Establishment Clause not 
simply by engaging in facially religious speech but by engaging in 
such speech for the purpose of promoting or advancing 
religion.”179  Thus, the legislature must have a legitimate purpose 
for engaging in legislative prayer,180 and that purpose “must ‘be 
sincere and not a sham.’ ”181 
 
175 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581 (2014) (quoting Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)). 
176 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94. 
177 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585. 
178 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 823 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court makes 
the subjective motivation of legislators the decisive criterion for judging the 
constitutionality of a state legislative practice.”). Judge Sutton argued that the 
subjective intent of lawmakers should not be relevant to an Establishment Clause 
analysis and that courts should look to the “objective content of the prayer [and] the 
impact it has on the listeners.” Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494,  
524 (Sutton, J., concurring). This approach is irreconcilable with government  
speech doctrine and Supreme Court precedent. See infra notes 179–190 and 
accompanying text. 
179 Gaylord, Facially Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 401 
(emphasis added). 
180 The Supreme Court has recognized several legitimate purposes for engaging 
in legislative prayer, including to “remind[] lawmakers to transcend petty 
differences in pursuit of a higher purpose,” “to lend gravity to the occasion and 
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage,” to “unite lawmakers in their 
common effort,” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575, 583, “to acknowledge the place 
religion holds in the lives of many private citizens,” “to accommodate the spiritual 
needs of lawmakers and connect them to a tradition dating to the time of the 
Framers” to “reflect the values [lawmakers] hold as private citizens,” and to provide 
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Second, absent proof of impermissible intent, incidental 
advancement or endorsement of a particular religion should not 
render a prayer practice unconstitutional.182  This is because 
government messages are susceptible to various 
interpretations.183  As the Court explained in Summum with 
regard to the Ten Commandments monument that constituted 
government speech, “Even when a monument features the 
written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, 
and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety 
of ways.”184  How a prayer practice is perceived objectively by 
observers should therefore not be relevant to the constitutional 
analysis: “there is no place for a ‘heckler’s veto.’ ”185  
Furthermore, if a legislature is required to offer prayers of a 
variety of faiths—that is, alter its message—to prevent observers 
from perceiving advancement or endorsement of one faith, it 
loses its fundamental right as speaker to determine the content 
of its message.186 
This intent-focused approach fits comfortably within the 
Court’s existing legislative prayer jurisprudence.  Generally, the 
Establishment Clause forbids the government from expressing 
messages that endorse, favor, or promote religion irrespective of 
the government’s purpose for engaging in that expression.187  But 
this principle does not apply with like force in the legislative 
prayer context.  In Marsh, the Presbyterian chaplain’s 
sixteen-year tenure did not in itself unconstitutionally advance 
that faith because no “impermissible motive” was shown; the 
chaplain was selected for his “performance and personal 
qualities,” not his religious faith.188  And in Town of Greece, eight 
 
“an opportunity for [lawmakers] to show who and what they are,” id. at 587–88 
(plurality opinion). 
181 Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1056; Gaylord, Facially 
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 402. 
182 See Kristopher L. Caudle, Note, Unanswered Prayers: Lund v. Rowan County 
and the Permissiveness of Sectarian Prayers in Municipalities, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 625, 659–60 (2014). 
183 Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1054; Gaylord, Facially 
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 393. 
184 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474 (2009); see also id. at 475 
(“[T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and 
sentiments in the minds of different observers . . . .”). 
185 Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1052; Gaylord, Facially 
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 339. 
186 Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1054. 
187 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
188 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983). 
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years of exclusively Christian prayer-givers did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because the town did not select its 
prayer-givers in an intentionally discriminatory manner.189  
Accordingly, the relevant inquiry must be “whether the 
legislature’s practice—whatever that practice might be—evinces 
an unlawful discriminatory motive.”190 
C. Areas of Inquiry That May Evince Impermissible Intent 
Determining the intent behind a lawmaker-led prayer policy 
is no different than any other legislative prayer policy.  The 
following subsections provide a framework based on four 
particular aspects of prayer practices, or areas of inquiry, that 
may evince impermissible intent: (1) the stated purpose of the 
prayer practice; (2) the prayer-giver selection process; 
(3) content-based restrictions or requirements imposed by the 
legislature; and (4) the content of the prayers.  Further, each 
subsection analyzes the legislator-led prayer practices in Lund 
and Bormuth and the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ reasoning. 
1. The Stated Purpose of the Prayer Practice 
A first area of inquiry to identify impermissible intent is the 
stated purpose of the prayer practice.  Take, for example, the 
following resolution: “The Town of Utopia Board of Trustees 
hereby adopts the following prayer policy for the purpose of 
advancing the teachings of Jesus Christ, God the Father’s only 
Son, the one and only Lord and Savior.”  The board’s express 
purpose—to advance Christianity—renders the policy facially 
unconstitutional. 
Courts can also identify impermissible intent in remarks 
made by lawmakers during public meetings—separate from the 
prayers—or through deposition testimony.  For example, in 
Williamson v. Brevard County, commissioners stated in 
deposition testimony that the opening prayer is “a long-standing 
tradition of honoring the Christian community” and that 
“allowing Christian invocations show[s] the board’s support for 
Christianity.”191  As the Eleventh Circuit held, engaging in  
 
 
189 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014). 
190 Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 311 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)  
(Agee, J., dissenting). 
191 928 F.3d 1296, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original). 
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legislative prayer for these purposes violates the Supreme 
Court’s command that the custom not be exploited to advance one 
religion to the exclusion of others.192 
Neither board of commissioners in Lund and Bormuth 
adopted a formal resolution stating the purpose of the 
invocations.  During the litigation, Rowan County averred that 
the prayers at its meetings were offered “for the edification and 
benefit of the commissioners and to solemnize the meeting.”193  
Similarly, Jackson County claimed its prayers served a 
ceremonial function, similar to those in Town of Greece.194  Both 
purported purposes are legitimate, and there was no evidence 
that these purported purposes were insincere or a pretext. 
2. The Prayer-Giver Selection Process 
A second area of inquiry is prayer-giver selection.  A 
legislator-led prayer policy can either extend the prayer 
opportunity to legislators or restrict it to them.  The policies in 
Lund and Bormuth fell into the latter category.  Adopting a 
policy that simply extends the prayer opportunity to legislators 
cannot in itself, at least facially, violate the Establishment 
Clause.195  But a policy that restricts the opportunity to them can, 
if adopted for impermissible reasons. 
There are at least three legitimate reasons for a legislature 
to restrict the prayer opportunity to its members.  First, the 
legislature may wish to maintain absolute control over the 
content of the prayers.  If the legislature extends the prayer 
opportunity to nonmembers, it necessarily forfeits that control.  A 
legislature may fear that guest prayer-givers will offer 
disparaging or offensive invocations, which would defeat the 
unifying purpose of legislative prayer.196  The Maryland House of 
 
192 Id. at 1315 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95). 
193 Lund, 863 F.3d at 274. 
194 See Defendant’s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at  
4–6, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 
849 F.3d 266 (4th Cir.), rev’d en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 2:13-cv-1376-
MOB-MJH), 2014 WL 12768703. 
195 See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
196 It is not uncommon for guest prayer-givers to deliver controversial 
invocations. For example, a member of the Satanic Temple concluded her prayer 
before the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly in Alaska with “Hail Satan,” 
prompting legislators and attendees to walk out. Brie Stimson, Woman’s ‘Hail Satan’ 
Invocation Prompts Walkout from Alaska Town Meeting, FOX NEWS (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hail-satan-invoked-during-alaska-government-
meeting-prayer. In addition, a guest minister concluded his prayer before the 
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Delegates, for example, switched to a strictly legislator-led 
prayer policy after some guest ministers offended members with 
“overly Christian prayers that sometimes veered into politically 
touchy subjects, such as abortion.”197  Because the House of 
Delegates acted with a permissible purpose—to foster a more 
inclusive atmosphere and to prevent further offense—it would be 
insignificant whether all legislators and subsequent prayers were 
of one faith. 
Second, a legislature may be concerned over the threat of 
litigation.  Denying any prospective prayer-giver’s request to 
deliver an invocation risks creating a misperception that the 
legislature is discriminating among prayer-givers.198  Indeed, 
multiple courts have struck down prayer policies on the basis of 
discriminatory prayer-giver selection.199  As Justice Alito 
explained in Town of Greece: 
The effect of requiring such exactitude would be to pressure 
towns to forswear altogether the practice of having a prayer 
before meetings of the town council.  Many local officials, 
puzzled by our often puzzling Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and terrified of the legal fees that may result 
from a lawsuit claiming a constitutional violation, already think 
that the safest course is to ensure that local government is a 
religion-free zone.200 
 
Minnesota House of Representatives by insinuating that President Obama is  
not a Christian, sparking outrage among legislators. Jay Weiner, Legislative 
Firestorm Erupts Over Bradlee Dean’s Prayer, MINNPOST (May 20, 2011), 
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2011/05/legislative-firestorm-erupts-over-
bradlee-deans-prayer/. 
197 Havard, supra note 173. 
198 Cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585 (2014) (finding the town’s 
policy nondiscriminatory in part because the town “would welcome a prayer by any 
minister or layman who wished to give one”). 
199 See, e.g., Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1296, 1316 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(holding a prayer practice unconstitutional in part because “[t]he selection 
procedures as practiced t[ook] religious beliefs into account, . . . favoring some creeds 
over others”); Hunt v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, slip op. at 
15–17 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (holding unconstitutional a prayer policy that 
opened the invocation opportunity only to leaders of “religious associations with an 
established presence in the Kenai Peninsula Borough” because faiths practiced by 
some residents of the borough, including Judaism and Satanism, were excluded 
under the policy). 
200 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Am. Legion v. 
Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2097 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[G]overnment bodies trying to comply with the inevitably arbitrary decisions of the 
courts would face . . . intractable questions.” (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 596 
(Alito, J., concurring))). 
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Accordingly, a desire to avoid the threat of litigation is adequate 
justification to restrict a prayer opportunity to lawmakers.201 
Lastly, legislator-led prayer better “accommodate[s] the 
spiritual needs of lawmakers,” one of the primary purposes of 
legislative prayer.202  As the Supreme Court explained, legislative 
prayer “reflect[s] the values [legislators] hold as private 
citizens.”203  Allowing legislators to offer the prayers themselves 
gives them the opportunity to personally “show who and what 
they are.”204 
There are ways courts can determine whether a legislature’s 
decision to restrict the prayer policy to its members is motived by 
impermissible intent.  First, courts can look to legislators’ 
deposition testimony and public statements.  For example, if 
members of an all-Christian legislature state that the prayer 
opportunity is reserved to lawmakers to ensure all prayers are 
Christian, the policy would be plainly unconstitutional.  Second, 
courts can infer an impermissible, discriminatory purpose in how 
the legislator-led prayer policy is carried out.  If, for example, a 
board rescinds the prayer opportunity from a commissioner of a 
minority faith or discontinues the practice altogether when a new 
commissioner of a minority faith is elected, such action would 
indicate disfavor toward the minority commissioner’s faith.205 
Williamson provides an excellent example of intentional 
discriminatory prayer-giver selection.  In Williamson, the 
Eleventh Circuit held unconstitutional a practice of each 
commissioner selecting a guest minister on a rotating basis 
because the commissioners “used [their plenary discretion] to 
discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs, favoring some 
monotheistic religions over others and disfavoring and 
excluding—at least—religions that are polytheistic, pantheistic, 
or otherwise outside of the ‘mainstream.’ ”206  In deposition 
testimony, all but one commissioner indicated that prospective 
 
201 Rowan County, for example, was ordered to pay $285,000 in legal fees to the 
American Civil Liberties Union. Caleb Parke, Cost of Prayer: North Carolina  
County Pays $285G for Opening Meetings in Jesus’ Name, FOX NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/us/cost-of-prayer-north-carolina-county-pays-285k-for-
opening-meetings-in-jesus-name. 
202 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 310 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(Agee, J., dissenting). 
206 Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019). 
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prayer-givers’ religious beliefs would significantly affect whether 
or not they would be invited to deliver an invocation.207  In 
addition, some commissioners expressed that the prayer 
opportunity was meant only for people of particular types of 
religions, indicating that prospective prayer-givers of certain 
faiths would either be more closely scrutinized or outright 
banned from offering an invocation.208  Accordingly, the 
prayer-giver selection procedure had been unconstitutionally 
exploited for an impermissible purpose—to favor monotheistic 
religions to the exclusion of others.209 
Under the prayer policy in Lund, each commissioner was 
afforded the opportunity to offer the opening prayer on a rotating 
basis.210  When the plaintiffs brought this action, all five 
commissioners were Protestant Christian.211  Judge Wilkinson 
concluded that the board restricted the prayer opportunity to its 
members to ensure that the prayers remained Christian.212  This 
conclusion is sheer judicial ipse dixit.  The board rotated the 
prayer opportunity among its members as a matter of 
long-standing tradition.213  The record did not indicate when the 
tradition began or why the board that adopted the practice chose 
to restrict the prayer opportunity to commissioners.  Thus, there 
was no basis to conclude that the board sought to advance 
Christianity; and because there was no evidence of purposeful 
exploitation, any perceived advancement of Christianity was 
merely incidental and therefore constitutionally insignificant. 
Judge Wilkinson also emphasized that the policy was too 
“rigid” and “restrictive” and failed to embrace religious 
pluralism.214  This reasoning is flawed.  First, municipalities are 
only required to maintain a policy of nondiscrimination; they are 
not required to “promote ‘a “diversity” of religious views.’ ”215  
Second, a strictly legislator-led prayer policy can be more flexible 
and inclusive than the policies upheld in Marsh and Town of 
 
207 Id. at 1313. 
208 Id. at 1313–14. 
209 Id. at 1314–15. 
210 See Lund, 863 F.3d at 273. 
211 Id. at 282. 
212 Id. at 282–83. 
213 Id. at 273. 
214 Id. at 282. 
215 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 586 (2014) (quoting Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
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Greece.216  Under a fixed-chaplain policy, a Christian chaplain 
can offer Christian prayers throughout the course of his tenure, 
and absent an impermissible motive, the chaplain can be 
reappointed over and over again, up to at least sixteen years.217  
This could effectively undermine some of the purposes of 
legislative prayer.  Christian prayers referencing Jesus Christ 
would neither “reflect the values” Muslim legislators hold nor 
give Muslim legislators the opportunity “to show who and what 
they are.”218  The same might be true for Muslim legislators 
under a rotating guest minister policy in a municipality with no 
mosque.219 
The prayer policy in Bormuth was nearly identical to the 
policy in Lund.  The Sixth Circuit found no evidence that the 
board adopted its practice with discriminatory intent.220  
Accordingly, because the prayer practice was “facially neutral,” 
Judge Griffin found it “immaterial” that all nine commissioners 
were Christian at the time the practice was challenged.221 
One commentator writes that Jackson County’s policy allows 
the board to “choose[] which persons can and cannot give the 
opening prayers based solely on their religious sect.”222  This is an 
utter mischaracterization of the policy.  The board does not pick 
and choose prayer-givers.  Each commissioner is afforded the 
opportunity to deliver the invocation when his or her turn in the 
rotation arises.  As Judge Griffin explained, “Were Mr. Bormuth 
elected to the Jackson County Board of Commissioners, he could 
freely begin a legislative session with an invocation of his 
choosing, under the religion-neutral Jackson County prayer 
practice.”223  If anyone selects prayer-givers based on their 
religious sect, it is the voters of Jackson County.224 
The Sixth Circuit also addressed evidentiary challenges over 
whether statements contained in video recordings of committee 
meetings published to the board’s website after litigation 
 
216 Lund, 863 F.3d at 310 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
217 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–86 (1983). 
218 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion). 
219 See id. at 585–86 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Constitution does not require [a 
town] to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to 
achieve religious balancing.”). 
220 Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 513 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc); 
id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
221 Id. at 513–14 (majority opinion). 
222 Hill, supra note 94, at 37. 
223 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 513. 
224 See id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
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commenced were part of the record and should be considered on 
appeal.225  At one meeting in particular where the board 
discussed potential alternatives to its legislator-led prayer policy, 
a commissioner expressed the following concern: 
If somebody from the public wants to come before us and say 
they are an ordained minister, we are going to have to allow 
them as well.  And I think we are opening a Pandora’s Box here 
because you are going to get members of the public who are 
going to come up at public comment, and we are going to create 
a lot of problems here when certain people come up here and 
say things that they are not going to like.226 
The court ultimately declined to consider these remarks, noting 
that “even if [it] were to consider the proffered videos, [its] 
disposition would not change.”227 
This statement, standing alone, does not evince an 
impermissible, discriminatory motive.  As discussed, there are 
several legitimate reasons for restricting the prayer opportunity 
to lawmakers, including to control the prayer content to prevent 
controversial invocations.  The commissioner’s remarks, 
rationally construed, express a concern over guest prayer-givers 
delivering controversial invocations.  Thus, this statement does 
not suggest that the board acted with discriminatory intent in 
adopting and maintaining its strictly legislator-led prayer 
practice. 
3. Content-Based Restrictions or Requirements Imposed by the 
Legislature 
A third area of inquiry to identify impermissible intent is 
content-based restrictions or requirements imposed by the 
legislature.  In Town of Greece, the Court rejected arguments 
that the guest ministers’ prayers must be nonsectarian because 
such a requirement would force the government to “act as 
supervisors and censors of religious speech.”228  The Court 
concluded that “[o]nce it invites prayer into the public sphere, 
government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own 
 
225 Id. at 499 (majority opinion). 
226 CountyofJackson, Personnel & Finance Committee Hearing November 12, 
2013 Jackson County, MI, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2013) (37:55–38:16), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOOClwZpaXc. These statements were neither 
presented to the district court nor mentioned in Bormuth’s initial appellate brief, 
though they were mentioned in his reply. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 500. 
227 Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 501 & n.2. 
228 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581 (2014) (emphasis added). 
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God or gods as conscience dictates.”229  As Professor Corbin points 
out, censorship indicates the government is acting as a sovereign 
and regulating private speech, and inviting prayer into the public 
sphere suggests the government is hosting a forum for private 
speech.230 
But when legislative prayer is classified as government 
speech, Town of Greece’s instruction that a legislature must 
forfeit control over the content of the prayers should not apply.  If 
the government is speaking, it has absolute authority to select 
the content of its message.231  Thus, a legislature could, to an 
extent, impose content restrictions on its individual members’ 
prayers to maintain control over its message. 
To illustrate, a requirement that prayers not denigrate 
religious minorities or nonbelievers would likely be lawful 
because it is motivated by a legitimate purpose—to ensure the 
legislature’s message conforms to the Establishment Clause.232  
Conversely, a prohibition of Muslim prayers, or references to 
“Allah,” would likely be unlawful because it reflects disfavor 
toward Islam.  Likewise, a requirement that prayers be 
exclusively Christian would also likely be unlawful because it 
manifests a motive to advance Christianity. 
Moreover, a legislator-led prayer policy with a requirement 
that all prayers be nonsectarian would likely be constitutional.  
The Fourth Circuit confronted this issue in Turner v. City 
Council of Fredericksburg,233 a case decided before Town of 
Greece.  In Turner, the court classified the prayers as government 
speech and upheld the nonsectarian requirement because it was 
“designed to make the prayers accessible to people who come 
from a variety of backgrounds, not to exclude or disparage a 
particular faith.”234  The court noted that as speaker, the 
government may select the messages it would, and would not, 
 
229 Id. at 582. 
230 See Corbin, supra note 103, at 42. 
231 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995) (“[T]he fundamental rule under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has 
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]hen the State is the speaker,  
it may make content-based choices.”); see also Knippen II & Farmer, supra note 152, 
at 33 (“[T]he government, as speaker, has free reign [sic] over the content of the 
religious message.”). 
232 See Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1064. 
233 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by 
designation). 
234 Id. at 356. 
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like to express.235  This reasoning remains sound even after Town 
of Greece.  First, a nonsectarian requirement does not reflect an 
impermissible motive, but rather a desire to be inclusive.  
Second, Town of Greece spoke to a nonsectarian requirement in 
the context of the government regulating speech, not the 
government itself speaking.  Lastly, if “[p]rayer that reflects 
beliefs specific to only some creeds can still serve to solemnize 
the occasion,” so too can prayers specific to no religion that 
invoke universal themes.236 
Similarly, a legislator-led prayer policy that requires that all 
prayers be sectarian or theistic would also likely be 
constitutional.  Such a policy does not “advance any one” 
religion;237 if anything, it advances religion over irreligion.  By 
holding that prayers need not be nonsectarian, Town of Greece 
permits government to favor religion over irreligion in the 
legislative prayer context.238  To illustrate, in Barker v. Conroy, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the House of Representatives’ chaplain 
did not violate the Establishment Clause when he denied an 
atheist’s request to deliver a nonreligious invocation because the 
House’s rules require that all invocations be religious.239  The 
court reasoned that, “although the Court has warned against 
discriminating among religions or tolerating a pattern of prayers 
that proselytize or disparage certain faiths or beliefs, it has never 
suggested that legislatures must allow secular as well as 
religious prayer.”240 
The prayer policies in Lund and Bormuth were neutral with 
respect to prayer content.  The boards did not impose any 
content-based restrictions or requirements on their members.241  
The commissioners were free to offer a prayer to their God or 
gods—or to no god at all—as their consciences dictated.   
 
 
235 Id. (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 
288 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
236 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 583 (2014). 
237 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,  
794–95 (1983)). 
238 See Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1065 (“[B]ecause Marsh 
permits the government to advance religion over nonreligion by allowing prayer at 
the beginning of its meetings, the government must be able to exclude nonreligious 
or anti-religious speakers . . . .”). 
239 921 F.3d 1118, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
240 Id. at 1131. 
241 Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 272–73 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); 
Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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Accordingly, the absence of content-based restrictions or 
requirements is no basis to question the constitutionality of a 
legislative prayer practice. 
4. The Prayers Themselves: Advance, Disparage, and 
Proselytize 
The fourth and final area of inquiry to identify impermissible 
intent that this Note explores is prayer content.  In reviewing a 
prayer practice, impermissible intent may seem apparent from 
the prayers.  Marsh, however, instructs that judges should not 
concern themselves with the content of the prayers absent indicia 
of exploitation.242  Town of Greece reaffirmed this directive in 
dismissing arguments that prayers must be nonsectarian, but it 
subsequently approved judicial review of prayers in stating that 
“[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, 
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a 
challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely 
establish a constitutional violation.”243  Thus, judicial review of 
prayers is permitted—and indeed necessary—to determine 
whether a practice over time has been exploited to advance a 
particular religion, proselytize, or disparage nonbelievers or 
religious minorities.  But to what extent?  How closely should 
judges parse the content of prayers?  Line-drawing problems are 
inevitable. 
Without supplementary proof of purposeful exploitation, the 
content of prayers alone cannot unconstitutionally “advance” a 
particular religion.  Town of Greece clarified that sectarian 
legislative prayer is permissible “so long as the practice over time 
is not ‘exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage 
any other, faith or belief.’ ”244  Prayer is inherently religious.  
“The Supreme Court has long taken as given that prayer 
presumes a higher power.”245  And as the Tenth Circuit has 
explained, “all prayers ‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in one 
way or another.  The act of praying to a supreme power assumes  
 
 
242 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95. 
243 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581–83, 585 (2014). 
244 Id. at 583 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95). 
245 Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 936 F.3d 142, 152 (3d 
Cir. 2019). 
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the existence of that supreme power.”246  Therefore, the content of 
prayers in and of itself cannot demonstrate intent to exploit a 
prayer practice to advance a particular religion. 
Prayer content can, however, reflect intent to proselytize.  
Proselytization has been invoked in several facets of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.247  But the Supreme Court 
has neither articulated a concrete definition of proselytization 
nor provided a practical standard or test to identify it.248  In the 
legislative prayer context, many lower courts have sought to 
delineate what constitutes proselytization, but no clear judicial 
consensus has emerged.249  In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, the 
Fourth Circuit distinguished proselytizing from advancing, 
stating, “To ‘proselytize’ on behalf of a particular religious belief 
necessarily means to seek to ‘convert’ others to that belief, 
whereas to ‘advance’ a religious belief means simply to ‘forward, 
further, [or] promote’ the belief.”250  The Tenth Circuit drew a 
similar distinction in Snyder v. Murray City Corp., describing 
proselytization as “a more aggressive form of advancement”—
specifically, an “effort by the government to convert citizens to 
particular sectarian views.”251  The Tenth Circuit concluded that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998)  
(en banc). 
247 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Ten 
Commandments display); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 296–97 
(2000) (student-led, student-initiated prayer); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (passive religious displays); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 
U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (tax exemptions regarding religious periodicals); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
794–95 (legislative prayer); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 627 (1971) (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (state aide to church-related schools); Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of 
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (religious instruction in 
public schools). 
248 Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech Is 
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 83,  
85 (2007). 
249 See Caudle, supra note 182, at 659. 
250 376 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original). In Wynne, the 
Fourth Circuit invalidated a town council’s prayer practice because it advanced 
Christianity by frequently referencing “Jesus Christ” to the exclusion of other faiths. 
Id. at 301. 
251 159 F.3d at 1234 n.10 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14, 794–95). 
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only legislative prayer that “aggressively advocates a specific 
religious creed, or that derogates another religious faith or 
doctrine” will violate the Establishment Clause.252 
Prayer content can also reflect intent to disparage.  Prayer 
content may be so explicit that it unquestionably and 
unambiguously reflects a motive to denigrate—for example, an 
invocation that explicitly states another faith is inferior and 
believers of that faith are damned.  In Snyder, a private citizen 
sought to deliver an invocation that condemned politicians who 
believe in legislative prayer as “self-righteous,” “hypocritical,” 
“mis-guided, weak and stupid.”253  The Tenth Circuit held that 
denying this prospective prayer-giver’s request was lawful 
because “[n]ot only does [the] prayer explicitly attack the genre 
itself, it also disparages those who believe that legislative prayer 
is appropriate.”254 
Government speech doctrine demands that the subjective 
intent of the prayer-giver determines whether invocations 
constitute proselytization or disparagement.  Christian Keiner 
proposes a standard of proselytizing that is primarily objective, 
considering the potential impact the expression would have on a 
reasonable observer.255  But such a definition cannot apply to 
legislator-led prayer because, as government speech, the 
government’s message is not determined by how others perceive 
it.256  As Professor Gaylord explains, “[T]he government’s reasons 
for engaging in the speech (e.g., solemnizing an event or 
participating in the long-standing tradition of legislative prayer) 
may differ significantly from how others interpret that 
message.”257  A legislator who offers a prayer for the purpose of 
solemnizing the meeting is not proselytizing simply because 
someone construes the prayer in that manner.258 
Judge Wilkinson found that the Rowan County 
commissioners’ prayers advanced Christianity, proselytized, and 
 
252 Id. at 1234–35 (“Because Snyder’s prayer seeks to convert his audience to his 
belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, his prayer is itself 
proselytizing.”). 
253 Id. at 1228 n.3. 
254 Id. at 1235. 
255 See Keiner, supra note 248, at 105–06. 
256 See supra notes 183–185 and accompanying text. 
257 Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1054–55. 
258 See id. at 1054 (“[T]he fact that third parties might ascribe different 
meanings to the government’s speech does not change the fact that the government 
intended a specific message . . . .”). 
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disparaged non-Christians.  Before reviewing the content of the 
prayers, he noted that “Town of Greece instructs courts to 
consider a prayer practice from the perspective of the ‘reasonable 
observer.’ ”259  This interpretation of Town of Greece is misguided.  
First, the reasonable observer standard was invoked with respect 
to whether the prayers were unduly coercive, not whether the 
legislature exploited the prayer practice to proselytize.260  The 
standards are distinct.  Second, a reasonable observer, or 
endorsement, standard cannot be applied to legislative prayer 
because it “presupposes a premise that [government speech 
doctrine] rejects—that the government’s message can be 
determined by the meaning that others attribute to the 
government.”261 
In reviewing the content of the prayers, Judge Wilkinson 
erroneously made his subjective perception the determining 
criterion for whether the commissioners were advancing 
Christianity, proselytizing, or denigrating religious minorities.  
For example, he construed the following prayer as an “invocation 
advocat[ing] that the community take up the Christian faith”: 
Father, I pray that all may be one as you, Father, are in Jesus, 
and He in you.  I pray that they may be one in you, that the 
world may believe that you sent Jesus to save us from our sins.  
May we hunger and thirst for righteousness, be made perfect in 
holiness, and be preserved, whole and entire, spirit, soul, and 
body, irreproachable at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.262  
A construction that this prayer “urged attendees to embrace 
Christianity”263 is one of many possible meanings a listener could 
attribute to it—and, frankly, a very attenuated one.  Others may 
think that this is simply a legislator calling for his fellow 
lawmakers to unite “before they embark on the fractious business 
of governing.”264  One commissioner maintained, “We are not 
 
259 Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 586–87 (2014) (plurality 
opinion)). 
260 See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (plurality opinion). 
261 Gaylord, Facially Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 393; see 
also supra notes 182–186 and accompanying text. 
262 Lund, 863 F.3d at 285. 
263 Id. 
264 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 583; see also id. at 587 (first citing Salazar v. 
Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 720–21 (2010) (plurality opinion); then citing Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)) (“It is presumed that the reasonable 
observer is acquainted with this tradition and understands that its purposes are to 
lend gravity to public proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the 
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proselytizing; we are just praying in the only way that we know 
how.”265  In a similar vein, Judge Wilkinson thought the following 
prayer denigrated religious minorities: 
Lord, we confess that we have not loved you with all our heart, 
and mind and strength, and that we have not loved one another 
as Christ loves us.  We have also neglected to follow the 
guidance of your Holy Spirit and have allowed sin to enter into 
our lives.266 
This prayer, “implicitly ‘signal[ed] disfavor toward’ 
non-Christians,” Judge Wilkinson stated.267  Note the use of the 
word “implicitly.”  Disfavor toward non-Christians is simply the 
message Judge Wilkinson himself implied.268  Others may have 
perceived a different message—perhaps a call for commissioners 
to reflect upon past disagreements with one another and to be 
mindful of their future words, actions, or both.  Observers and 
judges are bound to perceive prayers differently.269  The Fourth 
Circuit’s failure to recognize the inapplicability of a reasonable 
observer standard in light of the prayers being government 
speech was fatal to its analysis. 
In Bormuth, Judge Griffin similarly reviewed the content of 
several prayers offered by commissioners.  But rather than 
parsing the content of individual prayers, he evaluated the 
prayers more generally.  He found the prayers to be solemn and 
 
lives of many private citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to proselytize 
or force truant constituents into the pews.”). 
265 Tim Funk & Michael Gordon, Prayer Delivery May Change at Many NC 
Government Meetings After Supreme Court Action, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 28, 
2018), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/living/religion/article213983094.html. 
266 Lund, 863 F.3d at 284. 
267 Id. at 285 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589 
(plurality opinion)). 
268 Id. at 316–17 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“At most, [the majority] subjectively 
intuits the prayers ‘implicitly signaled disfavor toward non-Christians’ whenever 
they ‘portrayed the failure to love Jesus or follow his teachings as spiritual defects.’ ” 
(quoting id. at 285 (majority opinion))). 
269 Compare, e.g., id. at 286 (majority opinion) (“By proclaiming the spiritual 
and moral supremacy of Christianity, characterizing the political community as a 
Christian one, and urging adherents of other religions to embrace Christianity as 
the sole path to salvation, the Board in its prayer practice stepped over the line.”), 
with id. at 316 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“[T]he prayers by the commissioners never 
explicitly or implicitly ask the hearers to change beliefs, to adopt as true any 
principles of the Christian faith, or anything else traditionally understood to be 
words imploring conversion. In addition, none of the prayers here threaten 
damnation to those of different faiths, belittle or chastise dissenters, or denigrate 
any other religious viewpoints.” (citing Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 
1235 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc))). 
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respectful and used as a means to invoke Divine guidance before 
engaging in lawmaking, similar to those in Town of Greece.270  
Bormuth called the court’s attention to one portion of one prayer, 
which he believed denigrated nonbelievers and religious 
minorities: “Bless the Christians worldwide who seem to be 
targets of killers and extremists.”271  But the court found that this 
one remark, even if it were construed as a form of denigration—
which would be quite an attenuated construction272—did not 
despoil the Board’s practice, which overall fit within this 
country’s tradition of legislator-led prayer.273  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the Jackson County Board of Commissioners used 
the prayers to “seek guidance to ‘make good decisions that will be 
best for generations to come’ and express well-wishes to military 
and community members.”274  Accordingly, because the board 
used its prayer practice for permissible purposes, the content of 
the prayers was constitutionally insignificant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court must clarify the uncertainties 
surrounding legislative prayer.  The Court’s failure to address 
whether legislative prayers are government or private speech 
risks the continued invalidation of prayer practices that adhere 
to the “tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures.”275  Legislator-led prayer is one such tradition.  
Legislator-led prayer constitutes government speech; therefore, 
only prayer policies motivated by impermissible intent should 
violate the Establishment Clause.  Had the Fourth Circuit 
considered that the prayers were government speech, and how 
government speech doctrine affects the Establishment Clause 
inquiry, it would have had no basis to strike down Rowan 
County’s prayer practice.  Government speech doctrine is, in 
effect, legislator-led prayer’s saving grace. 
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